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ABSTRACT 
A powerful confluence of architectural, technological, and socio-economic forces is 
transforming the U.S. electricity market. These trends and developments are placing 
tremendous pressure on utilities triggering changes in electricity production, 
transmission, and consumption. Increased democratized choice over energy usage, for 
instance, is empowering consumers to take key actions such as peak shaving, flexible 
loading, and installation of grid automation and intelligence solutions. A key step to 
achieving full benefits of these programs is repurposed Utility 2.0 concepts: the 
distributed grid, innovations in electric market design, real-time automated monitoring 
and verification, deployment of microgrids, increased uptake of ‘smart meters and 
smarter’ grids, and investment in data analytics in order to incentivize efficient market 
design and flexibility. Using a seven-part multi-dimensional framework, this paper 
examines the role of infrastructure network, revenue models, customer interface, 
business model resilience, organizational logic and mandate, risk management, and 
value proposition in improving communication with consumers and operational 
boundary of utilities in the new utility business model regime. The paper also assesses 
two prominent utility business models, the New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision 
(REV) and Great Britain’s ‘Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs” (RIIO) 
legislation in order to illustrate potential changes that await the energy utility actors. We 
conclude that positioning the ‘business model’ as the unit for analysis provides a robust 
and multi-dimensional tool for evaluating the suitability of new proposals for electric 
utilities and energy governance. 
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1.0. INTRODUCTION 
Key disruptive challenges are expected to provoke momentous redesign in modern 
electricity infrastructures and destabilization of the century-old dominance of the 
government regulated, vertically integrated monopoly business model that is the energy 
utility. The disruption was initiated in the 1990s when, under the guise of deregulation, 
competition, innovation, and consumer involvement was introduced in the supply-
oriented architecture (Philipson & Willis, 1999). The dominance of the traditional utility 
business model – what can be called ‘Utility 1.0’ – has since additionally been confronted 
with a confluence of architectural, technological, social, and economic developments that 
will likely accelerate the emergence of ‘Utility 2.0’ business models:  
a) Distributed renewable energy sources, like solar energy, have become increasingly 
cost-competitive (Feldman, et al., 2015);  
b) State-wide demand side management (DSM) and energy efficiency (EE) policy 
schemes are progressively more aggressive (Barbose, Goldman, Hoffman, & 
Billingsley, 2013; Palmer, Grausz, Beasley, & Brennan, 2013); 
c) Energy demand growth patterns have reversed and are now flat to declining (Nadel 
& Young, 2014); 
d) Rapidly advancing “intelligent efficiency” technology options capable of unlocking 
device-level measurement and control at large-scale are now available (Rogers, 
Carley, Deo, & Grossberg, 2015); 
e) Existing infrastructural deficiencies – the American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE) gave the US energy sector a D+ rating (ASCE, 2013). For instance, according 
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to the Edison Foundation, national level costs over 2010-2030 are estimated at $582 
billion in nominal terms (Edison Foundation, 2008). Similarly, the New York 
Department of Public Services estimates state-wide investments of $30 billion over 
a ten-year timeframe (NYPSC, 2014); 
f) Federal pressure in the form of the requirements set by policy efforts such as the 
Clean Power Plan (CPP) will drive substantial change (DOE, 2015); 
g) Global coercion to transition to climate change appropriate development pathways, 
particularly with the signing of the December 2015 Paris Climate Agreement; 
h) Lagging capital investment in transmission and distribution infrastructure 
(Jacobsson & Jacobsson, 2012); 
i) Security threats from extreme weather as well as from cyber and physical terrorism 
(Ward, 2013); and 
j) Another risk faced by the conventional utility is that its asset base is prone to 
‘stranding’ – rapid depreciation of the asset base and its revenue generation 
potential. The limitations imposed by the notion of a climate change ‘budget’ for 
instance, which places much of the available fossil fuel resources as ‘unburnable’, 
threaten the long-term viability of the asset base (i.e. energy generation facilities that 
rely on fossil-fuel resources) (Jakob & Hilaire, 2015). 
The compounding pressures levied by these disruptive challenges has led some to argue 
the incompatibility of the 20th century business model (constructed around sales growth 
and asset base expansion) with 21st century demands. Captured under the concept of the 
“death spiral”, this position argues that the 20th century business model will make itself 
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increasingly un-competitive as its efforts to combat the aforementioned challenges will 
divide increasing operational costs across a decreasing customer base (Costello & 
Hemphill, 2014). Indeed, the recalcitrant position of several utilities, such as in Arizona 
and Georgia, has set the stage for conflict of this kind (Hess, 2015).  
As a result, the challenge overall has been posited as one requiring fundamental 
change to a new sustainable business model that can cope with the observed and 
expected disruptions – in short, this challenge has been determined to be an evolution to 
a “Utility 2.0” (Energy Future Coalition, 2013). Utility 2.0 characteristics will need to be 
such as to motivate – indeed, thrive within – a sustainable economy encouraging the 
minimization of consumption (or, at least, adheres to strict limitations on the 
consumption of water, energy, materials, etc.) while maximizing and prioritizing societal 
and environmental benefit over the sole purpose of economic growth (Jackson, 2009).  
However, the specifics of what would constitute a ‘Utility 2.0’ remain largely 
unclear. For instance, strategies of “defection” from traditional utility-customer 
relationships (where new technologies, particularly solar and storage, deliver “utility in 
a box” functionality, thus forcing an optional character on further interaction with 
traditional utilities) (Rocky Mountain Institute, 2014) compete with proposals that retain 
a much larger importance to centralized generation, transmission and distribution 
capability (Kind, 2013) or heterogeneous “system of systems” ideas (Ruth & Kroposki, 
2014). Efforts to situate such competing proposals have focused on the identification of 
possible trajectories, aligning the models across dimensions such as profit motivation and 
profit achievement (Satchwell & Cappers, 2015) or the speed of change and extent of 
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change (Zinaman, et al., 2015). Possible trajectories within such a two-dimensional 
landscape can take on an adaptive, evolutionary, reconstructive, or revolutionary trait 
(Zinaman, et al., 2015). 
Here, a case study analysis of the business models of two prominent proposals is 
developed to illustrate the potential changes that await the energy utility actors. First, 
fundamental change to the existing regulatory model has been put forth in New York 
through their “Reforming the Energy Vision” (REV) initiative. Critically, REV realigns 
the role of regulated utilities in terms of the ownership, management, and operation of 
electric delivery systems. Increased adoption of the portfolio of disruptive technologies 
is expected under this model. Second, the electric and gas regulator of Great Britain, 
OFGEM, is currently implementing its own original “Utility 2.0” concept via the 
“Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs” legislation (RIIO).  
Using a comparative business model analysis, a detailed overview of the 
characteristics, focus, structure, approach, etc. of the two proposals forms the core of this 
paper. To do so, the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 highlights the importance of 
the ‘business model’ as a unit for analysis and its application in the energy and utility 
sector. Noting some possible deficiencies with limited approaches, this Section 
introduces and describes the methodological and analytical framework with which 
Utility 2.0 business model candidates can be compared and evaluated; Section 3 applies 
the common methodological and analytical framework to the two selected case studies 
in the United States and Great Britain. This section includes a description of the two 
models and a brief overview of their origin; Section 4 outlines the lessons learned with 
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the framework and offers direction on its future application for additional Utility 2.0 
candidates; Section 5 concludes.  
2.0. PLACING THE ‘BUSINESS MODEL’ AS AN 
ANALYTICAL UNIT IN THE EVALUATION OF 
‘UTILITY 2.0’ CANDIDATES 
Positioning the ‘business model’ as the unit for analysis has become a common 
practice in the evaluation of proposals to address the energy sustainability and climate 
change challenge. For example, business model unit analysis was central in the following 
research efforts: 
a) energy service company (ESCO) model analysis revealed customer-side 
information gaps and suggests customer interface improvements to advance ESCO 
success (Pätäri & Sinkkonen, 2014); 
b) explorative analysis of generic business model showed investor preference for 
“customer intimacy” business models over lowest-cost or best technology models 
(Loock, 2012);  
c) regulatory reform of the distribution of renewable energy benefits needs to be in 
accordance with, or drive the change of, existing utility business models in order to 
retain and achieve nation-wide objectives for further distributed energy 
deployment (Barbose, et al., 2016); 
d) the role of external politico-institutional and socio-institutional dynamics in the 
formation and success of business model options is as a co-authoring agent in 
addition to internal decision-making (Provance, Donnelly, & Carayannis, 2011); 
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e) identification and analysis of ‘community solar’ business models as an alternative 
deployment strategy for solar energy that could mitigate or circumvent current 
concerns of negative impacts of distributed photovoltaic deployment for utility 
revenues and equity distributions of subsidies (Funkhouser, Blackburn, Magee, & 
Rai, 2015); or 
f) the proliferation of demand-side management models and options in terms of 
transaction characteristics, renewable energy correlation, and load control shows 
demand response diversification but energy efficiency complexity (Behrangrad, 
2015).  
Important dimensions in business model evaluation are the model’s main value 
proposition, its customer interface, infrastructure, and revenue approach (Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Chesbrough H. , 2007; Kindström, 2010; Richter, 2012; Pätäri & 
Sinkkonen, 2014; Hamel, 2000). Broad categorizations of business models can be extracted 
from applying the concept as an analytical unit along these lines. A first categorization, 
for instance, is made by Richter as he separates utility-side business models from 
customer-side business models, each with their own distinctive characteristics (Richter, 
2012). A customer-side business model, for instance, delivers value through 
customization and a services based approach, interacts with customers through a close 
long-term relationship and customer involvement in decision-making, and deploys many 
small-scale assets close to the point of use. In contrast, utility-side business models, create 
value through bulk generation of electricity, are commodity-focused rather than services-
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focused, deploy a small number of large-scale, centralized, assets, and focus on 
economies of scale and guaranteed rates of return.  
However, multiple, ambiguous definitions with confusing and overlapping 
terminology are in use for the concept of the ‘business model’ (Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Pätäri & Sinkkonen, 2014, p. 266). In addition, evolution within the 
energy utility sector is not limited to the broad categorization provided above as 
conventional utilities both contest and co-opt elements of the 21st century model. For 
instance, Hess observes how conventional energy utilities pursue strategies of conflict 
and disruption in the face of emerging distributed renewable energy generation (Hess, 
2015) while Funkhouser et al. illustrate strategies of cooptation in an effort to retain 
customers and mitigate revenue impacts (Funkhouser, Blackburn, Magee, & Rai, 2015).  
A critical challenge in the analysis of Utility 2.0 candidates, therefore, is to construct 
a comprehensive analytical framework capable of comparing business model options 
across the entirety of the energy utility spectrum. The pitfall of ambiguous definitions 
and overlapping terminology needs to be avoided in such a framework. Table 1 offers a 
multi-dimensional analytical framework that tries to deliver on such a set of definitions 
and characteristics that can be positioned in the evaluation of Utility 2.0 candidates. The 
framework defines the four dimensions introduced above and offers three additional 
dimensions.  
The dimensions were selected based on a literature review that extends beyond 
business model innovation in the energy sector (see the discussion above). In particular, 
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the dimensions account for the increasing focus on performance-based utility operation 
and the relationship dynamics that accompany such a shift (Kushler, Yokr, & Witte, 2006; 
Nowak, Baatz, Gilleo, Kushler, Molina, & York, 2015; Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2014) and 
the apparent requirement to move to a servitization system as mandated by the 
sustainability and climate change challenge (Carley, 2012; Steinberger, van Niel, & Bourg, 
2009; Barnett, Parry, Saad, Newnes, & Goh, 2013). 
Table 1: Application of dimensions of business model to conventional energy utility 
Dimension Definition Application to conventional 
utility 
Infrastructure Depicts the architecture of the 
company's value creation. It includes 
assets, know how, and partnerships. 
Centralized, large-scale, 
production. Long-distance 
transmission and distribution. 
Prohibitive cost for 
duplication, 
Revenue 
model 
Denotes the relationship between costs 
to produce the value proposition and 
the revenues that are generated by 
offering the value proposition to the 
customers. 
Bulk generation of electricity, 
commodity-focused 
Customer 
interface 
Involves the overall interaction with 
the customer including customer 
relationship, customer segments, and 
distribution channels. 
Consumers of electricity, 
monthly billing, short-term 
relationships, distant and 
standardized 
Value 
proposition 
Encompasses added values the 
business offers for resource providers, 
project developers, technology 
vendors, community served, and other 
potential partners. 
Low cost of electricity at high 
volume, guaranteed service. 
“Just and reasonable” prices. 
Shareholder return 
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Organizational 
logic and 
mandate 
The channel of authority for the utility 
to carry out a policy or course of 
action. This authority can be granted 
through a variety of channels 
(regulation, community-based 
management) and by a variety of 
actors (e.g., government, local 
community, shareholders).  
Regulatory compact 
Stockholders 
Business 
model 
resilience 
The utility’s capacity to change course 
in the face of potential existential 
business model risks. This capacity is 
influenced by the flexibility and 
complexity of both the business model 
but also the infrastructure it operates.  
Limited flexibility: maintains 
complex system of 
interconnections and 
generation capabilities with 
second-to-second 
management across (state) 
borders.  
Potential 
existential 
business 
model risks 
and risk 
management 
Vulnerability of the business model to 
(foreseeable) changes in the market 
environment in which it operates and 
how the model copes with such 
changes.  
Example: Extreme sale 
volume reduction could 
initiate “death spiral” (see 
introduction for additional 
risks). 
Table 1 offers a brief example application of the various dimensions to the existing 
utility business model (column 3). Before investigating possible Utility 2.0 candidates and 
applying the framework to these business model options, it is worthwhile to expand on 
the application of the analytical framework (with the exception of existential risks which 
is covered in the introduction) to the conventional energy utility: 
Infrastructure: The U.S. energy infrastructure is one of the most advanced energy 
systems in the world. Reliable, affordable and increasingly clean power and fuels are 
transmitted, stored, and distributed throughout an infrastructure that spans 
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approximately 2.6 million miles of interstate and intrastate pipelines, about 640,000 miles 
of transmission lines, 414 natural gas storage facilities, 330 ports, and over 140,000 miles 
of railways (DOE, 2015). The functions provided by this complex infrastructure operate 
24 hours a day, 365 days a year with high reliability and the longevity and high capital 
costs associated with the deployment of this infrastructure create a path-dependency 
where today’s decisions will either enable or constrain future energy system dimensions 
(DOE, 2015). The resulting electric utility landscape that manages the flows of all these 
energy sources has experienced consolidation to the point where a “baker’s dozen” of 13 
holding companies represents 50% of all integrated utilities, 64% of all restructured 
utilities, and 52% of the retail segment (Brooks, 2015).  
Revenue model: The first and best established functions of the state commission are 
to determine a utility’s revenue requirement and to establish the prices or rates for each 
class of consumers (Lazar, 2011). Investor-owned utilities in the U.S. operate under 
conditions of guaranteed rate of return set by the state commission. The cost structure of 
the conventional utility is further determined by its focus on large-scale asset investment, 
pursuit of economies of scale, and long-term infrastructural commitment. The cost-of-
service (COS) model is a core feature of the conventional utility (Burr, 2007; McDermott, 
2012). The model entails the “[t]he rate-making process … i.e., the fixing of “just and 
reasonable” rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interest” 
(Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 320 U.S. 591, 603, 1944). This has 
also been called the “End Result Doctrine” – “the aim of regulation is to preserve the 
balance of the original bargain between investors and customers” (McDermott, 2012).  
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Customer interface: Conventional energy utilities establish a utility-consumer 
relationship (Byrne & Taminiau, 2015) characterized by standard, billing-based 
interactions that can be seen as impersonal, distant, and standardized (Hannon, Foxon, 
& Gale, 2013). This distance is partly a result of the fiduciary obligation to the owners of 
the conventional energy utility – its shareholders (Byrne & Taminiau, 2015). A second 
aspect of the distance is that conventional energy utilities only limitedly interfere with 
the consumer as they do not go “beyond the meter” (e.g., behavioral stipulations of 
energy use are limited) (Hannon, Foxon, & Gale, 2013). Although the conventional energy 
utility, through demand-side management processes, offers financial assistance to the 
consumer to address their energy use pattern, the consumer is typically responsible for 
managing such changes (e.g., switching to high-efficiency appliances). Finally, and in key 
contrast to for instance multi-decade power purchase partnerships, supply contracts 
provided by the conventional energy utility model are short-term and, as such, provide 
flexibility to the consumer to switch providers (Hannon, Foxon, & Gale, 2013). 
Value proposition: the business model of the conventional utility pursues asset 
base expansion and, through its commodity-focused strategy, increased sale of products 
to deliver additional value to its shareholders: “Under traditional COS regulation, a 
utility is motivated to solve system reliability and customer access issues by investing 
capital instead of maximizing the value it can extract from existing assets” (Satchwell & 
Cappers, 2015). The goal of the conventional utility, as such, can be conceptually 
positioned at one end of a profit motivation spectrum: the “motivation to build 
incremental assets for the primary purpose of expanding its rate-base” (Satchwell & 
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Cappers, 2015). Regulators reward or punish utilities for taking actions to achieve public 
policy goals and to maintain “just and reasonable revenues”. So-called ‘incentive 
regulation’, however, establishes the working conditions of the utility. Within these 
conditions, “[g]iven any set of regulations, utilities will take those actions which most 
benefit their principal constituencies — shareholders and management — while meeting 
the requirements of the regulations” (Lazar, 2011). The principal constituency of the 
investor-owned utility is its shareholder base. To deliver shareholder value, the utility 
extends service to its customer base. 
Organizational logic and mandate: the conventional utility enjoys a co-
evolutionary history with the regulation that organizes and controls its operations (Lazar, 
2011). Within this system, the conventional utility is granted a natural monopoly (at least 
for its network components such as transport and service deliveries). Driven by a three-
fold mission of electrification, safety, and controlling the ability of franchises to exert 
monopoly-pricing power, the result is a centralized and top-down system (Burr, 2007). 
The institutional architecture in place to govern energy positioned underlying principles 
that guided this evolution: energy as a public necessity, an emphasis on affordability and 
abundance, a support for large-scale and centralized production, supply expansions to 
meet forecasted demand increases, a sense of technological optimism, and the need for 
expert control to account for the intrinsic complexity of the resulting system (Sovacool, 
2011). The ‘regulatory compact’ establishes the conditions between the utility and the 
government including the utility’s general objective to ensure the provision of safe, 
adequate, and reliable service at prices (or revenues) that are sufficient – but no more 
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than sufficient – to compensate the utility (Lazar, 2011). In addition, investor-owned 
utilities are governed by the stockholders and need to make decisions in the best benefit 
of this shareholder base.  
Business model resilience: utilities, with their large asset base and commitment to 
reliable and stable service, display limited flexibility to respond to new challenges or 
opportunities. Response to new risks or market environment changes depend on 
adaptations in the regulatory environment (Nyangon, Byrne, and Taminiau, 2017). 
Nevertheless, signaling modern society’s dependence on the viability of the energy 
utility, such changes have happened repeatedly throughout the lifetime of the COS 
model (McDermott, 2012). The energy transition to distributed photovoltaics, for 
instance, elevates business model concerns about the potential need for higher electricity 
rates or cost-shifting to non-solar customers, reduced utility shareholder profitability, 
reduced utility earnings opportunities, and inefficient resource allocation (Barbose, et al., 
2016). Among proposed responses to address these concerns are to reduce compensation 
to customers that have distributed energy installed, to facilitate higher-value distributed 
energy deployment, to gain utility ownership and financing of distributed photovoltaics, 
or to align utility profits with the deployment of distributed energy (Barbose, et al., 2016). 
However, as Hess (Hess, 2015) and (Bayulgen & Ladewig, 2016) note, several of these 
strategies can be construed as attempts at regime preservation rather than adaptation.  
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3.0. UTILITY 2.0 CANDIDATES: NY’S REV 
INITIATIVE AND GREAT BRITAIN’S RIIO 
To test whether the parameters listed in Table 1 can adequately evaluate Utility 2.0 
candidates, this section applies the Table 1 framework to the case study analysis of the 
NY REV Initiative and Great Britain’s RIIO models. To that end, Section 3.1 and Section 
3.2 discuss the REV and RIIO business models, respectively. 
3.1. NY REV Business Model 
In New York, retail peak demand is approximately 75% greater than average system 
load and 9% of power is lost in transmission (NYPSC, 2015a). Essential infrastructure 
investment is projected at $30 billion over the next ten years to address these and other 
challenges. 12 A primary response strategy by New York state government is the 
Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) approach. At its core, Governor Cuomo’s 2014 REV 
Initiative provides a business model that enables utilities to act as Distributed System 
Platform (DSP) providers to coordinate distributed energy markets and transition New 
York to a cleaner, more resilient, and more affordable grid.12 The 2015 New York State 
Energy Plan (NYSEP) outlines a series of support programs and mandates to enact REV: 
a 40% reduction in GHG (from 1990 levels), a 23% decrease in building energy 
consumption (from 2012 levels), and 50% renewable energy generation; all by 2030 
(NYPSC, 2015a). 
The REV model foresees a ‘transactive grid’ where “consumers and other parties 
can take full advantage of every type of energy resource – on both sides of the meter” 
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(Zibelman, 2016). Key within this ambition is to modify the traditional regulatory model 
and realign utility interests with consumer interests: utilities will be provided with the 
opportunity to share in the savings associated with efficiency increases (Zibelman, 2016). 
Two price signal processes play a critical role in this regard. First, REV establishes benefit-
cost analysis as a foundational procurement tool to determine distributed energy 
resource deployment (Nyangon, Byrne, and Taminiau, 2017; Zibelman, 2016). Perhaps 
chosen due to its regulatory familiarity and apparent simplicity (Felder & Athawale, 
2016), the benefit-cost analysis is to work in tandem with the multi-year distribution 
system integration plans (DSIPs) – developed by the utilities under the REV approach – 
in order to assure a fair, open and value-based decision making process (Zibelman, 2016). 
3 The benefit cost approach will be applied in four key categories of utility expenditures:  
a) Investments in DSP capabilities;  
b) Procurement of distributed energy resources through competitive selection; 
c) Procurement of distributed energy resources through tariffs; and  
d) Energy efficiency programs (Zibelman, 2016).  
The second key tool is to use locational marginal pricing principles to distribution 
to determine the full value of distributed resources. Locational marginal pricing 
principles can help distinguish what configuration of distributed resources and systems 
produces the overall best value for the system (Zibelman, 2016). 
																																																			
3 How the benefit cost tool can be best applied – or whether other tools should be used instead – is still 
under discussion (Felder & Athawale, 2016). 
	 17 
The REV model shares some characteristics with other ambitious and successful 
initiatives, particularly the German Energiewende (Binder & Foster, 2016). While New 
York is not alone in its efforts to motivate the further integration of distribution planning 
with distributed and renewable energy (similar efforts are happening in California 
(California Public Utilities Commission, 2014), Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Minnesota, 
the REV model represents a promising candidate for Utility 2.0 as it, at least, challenges 
two fundamental components of the conventional model: REV challenges the 
“assumptions that demand is inelastic, and that economies of scale make central 
generating stations the most economic way to meet power needs” (Brooks, 2015).  
Such a new perspective could unlock significant benefits. For instance, a 2009 study 
conducted by the Brattle Group for the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 
determined that, “...dynamic pricing can provide substantial benefits in New York State 
by reducing total resource costs, lowering customer market costs, and improving 
economic efficiency. With estimated market-based cost savings in the range of $171 
million to $579 million per year, the benefits to electric consumers can be significant, 
especially when technology serves to facilitate demand response and energy 
conservation” (Newell & Faraqui, 2009). 
3.2. Great Britain’s OFGEM Business Model 
Up to 2013, Ofgem operated a five-year transmission and distribution network cost 
pricing policy. Under this system, network charges were adjusted for inflation using the 
Retail Price Index combined with an efficiency savings target. Known as RPI-X, OFGEM 
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reached the conclusion that this approach would be unable to meet projected energy 
infrastructure investment requirements (Newton, 2010). 4 In addition, the RPI-X 
framework, introduced after privatization, was found to favor capital solutions over DSM 
and DER, and was also considered too complex (Fox-Penner, Harris, & Hesmondhalgh, 
2013). In an effort to respond to identified need for investment (Blyth, McCarthy, & Gross, 
2015), OFGEM turned to a new model where network companies’ revenues are composed 
of the sum of incentives, innovation, and outputs (RIIO model) (OFGEM, 2010). Network 
charges under this model are “closely linked to intelligent and forward-looking 
investment and to […] producing the services that consumers want” (Newton, 2010). The 
overriding objective of the approach is to encourage energy network companies to a) 
“play a full role in the delivery of the sustainable energy sector” and b) “deliver long-
term value for money network services for existing and future consumers” (OFGEM, 
2010). 
As part of the RIIO approach, the pricing framework period was extended from its 
previous five-year installments to eight years – the first installment of RIIO runs from 
2013 to 2021. The longer time period is intended to establish investor confidence, a 
resource in short supply in the distributed and renewable energy field (Parker & Guthrie, 
2016; EEFIG, 2015). Network companies that display innovation throughout this time 
period will be rewarded while those that failed to innovate face penalties and regulatory 
scrutiny – in aggregate, rewards of about 170 million pounds and penalties amounting 																																																			
4 OFGEM estimates that about 200 billion pounds are required to update the UK’s energy infrastructure, 
of which about 32 billion pounds need to be directed towards upgrading energy supply networks 
(Newton, 2010).  
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up to 220 million pounds are expected (OFGEM, 2011). This performance based revenue 
requirement approach with decoupling was first introduced in 2013 for pricing 
transmission and gas distribution networks, and later in the 2015 electricity distribution 
price control reviews (Fox-Penner, 2010; Fox-Penner, Harris, & Hesmondhalgh, 2013).  
The first evaluation reports regarding RIIO’s performance appear to suggest that 
the distribution companies are delivering on their required outputs at lower than 
expected cost. For instance, on the gas distribution side, the network companies are 
expected to outperform cost allowances by 2.1 billion pounds (12.5%) over the eight-year 
period (OFGEM, 2016) and, on the electricity distribution side, the network companies 
indicate that they will meet or exceed stated targets for the output categories (OFGEM, 
2015). However, as listed in the risk section below, the targets are likely too low 
essentially rewarding effort too easily – in other words, additional savings are possible 
but not being captured.  
4.0. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL BUSINESS MODEL 
ANALAYSIS 
The seven dimensions listed in Table 1 are applied to the two case studies.  
4.1. Infrastructure 
Both models were put in place to address the infrastructural challenges raised in the 
introduction. Using advanced data analytics, both REV and RIIO aim for a shift to low-
carbon decentralized generation and a multi-directional flow of data and energy. These 
models are also positioned to achieve what we might call the Infrastructure to Services 
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Transition, i.e. the evolution of infrastructure for commodity delivery to support greater 
personalization of value—new purposes, new platforms, enabled new infrastructure, and 
new apps (services) (Cooper, 2016). In New York, nearly double the $17 billion invested 
over the past decade to replace the State’s aging electric transmission and distribution 
infrastructure is needed between 2015 and 2025 to meet currently projected energy 
demand (NYPSC, 2015b). On the other hand, RIIO’s fifth transmission price control 
review (TPCR5) includes provisions for a wide range of options (e.g. charging and access 
rule changes, and infrastructure solutions for delivering outputs relating to reliability and 
availability of network services) (OFGEM, 2010). 
4.2. Revenue Model 
RIIO establishes a comprehensive, multi-criteria price control process intended to 
incentivize distribution company innovation (OFGEM, 2010). In contrast, the NYPSC 
(2015b) concluded that deployment of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is 
necessary to implement REV, arguing “dynamic pricing will require signals both to and 
from end-use equipment. Settlement of transactions will often require time-stamped 
usage data” and that “at a minimum, each utility DSIP will need to include a plan for 
dealing with advanced metering needs; however, plans that involve third party 
investment may be preferred over sweeping ratepayer funded investments.” The 
NYPSC’s REV proceeding also addresses the limits of traditional utility revenue models, 
the need for reform as well as other revenue issues in the electricity market such as 
earnings sharing mechanisms, “net plant reconciliation mechanism” or 
	 21 
“clawback”reforms, and total expenditures or totex, and recovery of DSP-related 
investments. 
4.3. Customer Interface 
Both REV and RIIO emphasize improved customer choice, and lower cost of service for 
consumers. For instance, the REV model underscores enhanced customer knowledge and 
tools for effective management, market animation and leverage of ratepayer 
contributions, system-wide efficiency, fuel and resource diversity, system reliability and 
resiliency, and carbon emissions reduction (NYPSC, 2015a, 2015b). Likewise, RIIO 
stresses the need for improved customer satisfaction, reliability, safe network services, 
competitive connection terms, and social obligations as well as meeting the set 
environmental targets (Fox-Penner, Harris, & Hesmondhalgh, 2013). 
4.4. Value Proposition (Sub-sectoral Price Control Versus 
Whole-Sector Price Control and Planning) 
The two price control strategies can be differentiated in terms of their target. RIIO has 
three price control targets: transmission (RIIO-T1), gas distribution (RIIO-G1), and 
electricity distribution (RIIO-ED1). In contrast, the REV strategy is applied to the energy 
industry as a whole (NYPSC, 2015b).  
In addition, the filing processes that dictate cost structure are handled differently. 
RIIO’s price control review structure takes 2- 2.5 years. It occurs in 4 main stages:  
a) outputs and price control methodology;  
b) business plans and proportionate treatment;  
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c) revised business plans and detailed assessment; and  
d) setting the price control.  
Through this approach, RIIO encourages companies to submit well-justified business 
plans. These plans should include outputs, efficient expenditure, efficiency financing, 
uncertainty, and risk. A high quality plan can be fast-tracked. The final price control 
decision will include many different aspects, including the following:  
• Expected primary outputs (categorized as customer satisfaction, reliability and 
availability, safe network services, connection terms, environmental impact, and 
social obligations) and the level at which primary outputs must operate;  
• Base revenue and allowed rate of return;  
• Portion of totex to be recovered in year it was spent and the proportion to be 
recovered through regulatory asset value (RAV);  
• Assumed asset lives for deprecation;  
• Amount of money to be collected from consumers for the innovation stimulus 
package;  
• Secondary deliverables (intermediate outputs that will ensure delivery of longer 
term high cost projects);  
• Upfront efficiency incentive rates;  
• Other incentives and penalties;  
• Arrangements for future market testing;  
• Third party agreements;  
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• Uncertainty mechanisms; and 
• Midpoint review scope and timing.   
On the other hand, REV is envisioned as a three-phase process involving filing a  
1) Energy efficiency transition implementation plans (ETIPs). Such plans were 
submitted March 31, 2015 and implementation began in January 2016.  
2) Interim action plan and  
3) Distribution system implementation plans (DSIPs) to summarize how the utility 
plans to implement REV over the next 5 years. They will be updated every two 
years. DSIPs contain proposals for capital and operating expenditures to build and 
maintain DSP functions, and the system information needed by third parties to plan 
for effective market participation.  
This DSIP filing will be a two-part process. The Initial DSIP, due June 30, 2016 
should include distribution system planning, forecasted demand growth, identification 
of beneficial DER locations, distribution grid operations, and distribution system 
administration data. A supplemental DSIP is expected to be added in future, and will 
include information on distribution planning and grid operations, granularity of pricing, 
data access to facilitate market transition, and overall system planning.  
4.5. Organizational Logic and Mandate (Aspirational Versus 
Standardized Ratemaking) 
REV is a socio-environmental aspiration encouraged by the transition of 
distribution utilities to DSPs and supported by a series of targeted initiatives. RIIO is a 
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standardized ratemaking framework that transitions the gas and electricity sectors 
towards a cost-effective sustainable core. 
In other terms, REV is altering political structure, while RIIO is altering economic 
structure. In RIIO, the obligations of stakeholders remain the same, but in REV, 
obligations change. Distribution utilities are asked to act as DSPs. To further elaborate, a 
DSP is defined as “an intelligent network platform that will provide safe, reliable, and 
efficient electric services by integrating diverse resources to meet customers and society’s 
evolving needs. The DSP fosters broad market activity that monetizes system and social 
values, by enabling active customer and third party engagement that is assigned with the 
wholesale market and bulk power system” (NYPSC, 2015b). Furthermore, ESCO’s, which 
currently provide only commodity service in NY, are encouraged to offer more classes of 
service. RIIO does not change the mandate of involved parties like REV does, but instead 
encourages behavior changes by altering the rate base to reflect more parameters. 
4.6. Business Model Resilience (Specialization Versus 
Generalization) 
RIIO has three innovation funds (outside of the rate-case structure) available 
separately for both the gas and electricity sectors. REV has a network of over tenfold-
more programs such as NY Green Bank, NY-Sun, K Solar, Charge NY, BuildSmart NY, 
etc. However, the usage of some of these programs will be built into rate-cases. RIIO 
offers modifications for existing rate cases should the price control prove to act against 
public interests.  
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Both processes involve a more exhaustive analysis of costs in categories previously 
ignored. Increased stakeholder involvement, longer-term rate contracts, and the sheer 
regulatory size of the initiatives increase complexity. 
4.7. Potential (Existential) Business Model Risks and Risk 
Management 
 A common difficulty with price control strategies is to determine the level at which 
such prices are set. In the case of RIIO, for instance, British Gas indicated that the targets 
stipulated by RIIO were “overly generous”: 38 out of 40 targets were reached by the 
network companies in the first year (out of a 8-year strategy) (British Gas, 2014). This 
concern of “over-remuneration” – targets are linked to direct rewards and penalties – was 
shared by the Citizens Advise Bureau in their consultation submission to OFGEM 
(Citizens Advise, 2014). Such a risk should be of primary concern to the RIIO approach: 
in part, the RPI-X was criticized and replaced precisely because of over-remuneration of 
the network companies for their services. For instance, under RPI-X, rates of return for 
gas distribution and gas transmission companies were higher than expected (OFGEM, 
2014). Similarly, review of the first two years of performance on the RIIO electricity side 
show that all network companies are expected to “exceed the allowed return of 7%, by 2-
3 percentage points” (OFGEM, 2015). 
Other concerns with distribution utilities acting as DSPs include discrimination 
against third parties, favoring utilities' facilities, information asymmetry, and lack of 
access to lower costs of capital (NYPSC, 2015b). However, distribution utilities were 
selected because they are well positioned to take on the responsibilities and are able to 
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do so quickly at lower system cost. To reduce the market concerns, utility DER ownership 
is limited to:  
• Energy storage and generation on utility property  
• support demonstration projects and 
• where there is no market (such as low income communities).  
4.8. Combined Analysis of Dimensions 
Table 2 introduces the combined analysis of the dimensions.  
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5 DSPs (distributed platform providers) act like “mini-ISOs” situated between the NYISO and consumers. DSPs will provide pricing structures by 
using localized automatic systems to balance production and load in real time to allow for more DER integration. 
14 “Totex” is total expenditures. Under totex, that capital and operating expenditures are treated as equivalent and recovered under the same 
formula. The formula sets a ratio of “slow” money to “fast money”. The “slow” money is included in the RAV and the “fast” money is recovered 
on an annual basis. 
15 Known formally as the Sliding Scale Incentive (introduced in DPCR4), the IQI discourages the submission of inflated expenditure forecasts. The 
IQI individualizes efficiency incentive rates.  
Table 2: Common framework analysis of business models 
 
NY REV Model Great Britain’s Ofgem (RIIO) Model 
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 
• Both REV and RIIO address the infrastructure 
related challenges raised in the introduction 
section. 
• Emphasize Infrastructure to Services Transition, i.e. 
support for greater personalization of value—new 
purposes, new platforms, enabled new 
infrastructure, and new apps (services). 
• In New York, $30 billion of investment in the 
State’s aging grid infrastructure is needed in the 
next ten years.  
• RIIO’s TPCR5 has infrastructure related provisions including 
charging and access rule changes, and reliability and network 
infrastructural-related services. 
• Apply advanced data analytics, and multi-directional flow of 
data and energy for improved service delivery. 
 
R
ev
en
ue
 M
od
el
 
• Distribution utilities will act as Distributed 
System Platform (DSP) 
• Market animation and leverage of ratepayer 
contributions; system-wide efficiency; fuel and 
resource diversity; system reliability and 
resiliency; reduction of carbon emissions 
• DSPs5 will provide pricing structures 
• Efficiency will be treated like part of utility 
revenue requirement, not a dedicated surcharge 
• Comprehensive, multi-criteria price control. 
• Three elements of revenue restriction: base revenue, revenue 
adjustment for rewards/penalties, uncertainty mechanisms 
• Rather than set allowed revenues for operating and capital, 
RIIO combines these into “Totex”14 
• For base revenues, benchmarking analysis of historical costs  
• Partially symmetric upfront incentives 
• IQI15 sets the strength of the upfront efficiency incentives 
according to the differences between utilities forecasts and 
Ofgem's assessment  
• Use the return on regulated equity (RORE) developed in 
DPCR5 to check that package fits together appropriately 
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6 PSRs (platform service revenues) are revenues that utilities, in their capacity as DSP providers, will earn from market participants.  
7 New MBEs (market based earnings) could include value added from services such as an online portal for customers, transaction/ platform 
access fees, optimization/scheduling services that add value to DER, energy services financing, engineering services for micro-grids, etc.  
8 EIMs (earning impact mechanisms) are monetized. Performance incentives. They could be used for peak reduction, EE, customer engagement 
and information access, affordability, and interconnection. Different EIMs do not have to have the same directionality. They should be established 
on a multi-year basis.  
9 “Clawback” refunds unspent amounts of utilities’ capital budget to consumers. This can be revised so the money that would have been spent on 
a project can be retained if DER supplants the need for project. Clawback could also be modified so that utilities are indifferent to whether it is 
spent by them or a third party.  
10 ESMs (earning sharing mechanism) allow utilities to retain earnings above a baseline return on equity. Beyond that level, earnings are shared 
between utilities and customers. At higher levels, savings are dedicated entirely to consumers.  
11 Scorecards measure performances that do not have any direct earnings impacts. Scorecards are proposed for system utilization and efficiency, 
distributed generation, EE, and dynamic load penetration, carbon reduction, opt-in TOU rate efficiency, market development, MBE use, customer 
satisfaction, customer enhancement, and conversion of fossil fuel end uses. 
12. The “value of the D” is the benefit that should be produced to the customer in terms of total cost avoided or reductions to the distribution 
system by DER. The value of the “D” is not established, while LMP is. 
13 Time of use rates 
• PSRs6 and MBEs7 replace EIMs8  
• Modified clawback9 mechanisms to encourage 
third party interactions 
• ESMs10 tied to performance index 
• Scorecards11 to evaluate non-monetized 
measurements 
• 3-year rate plans (opt in for 5) 
• Value of DER calculated as LMP+D12 
• Increased encouragement of TOU13 rates 
 
C
us
to
m
er
 
In
te
rf
ac
e 
• Emphasize enhanced customer knowledge and 
tools for effective management. 
 
 
 
• Emphasizes improved customer satisfaction, reliability, safe 
network services, better connection terms, and social 
obligations as well as meeting the set environmental targets. 
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16 Transmission (TPCR5), gas distribution (GDPCR2), electricity distribution (DPCR6) price control reviews.  
V
al
ue
 P
ro
po
si
tio
n 
• Remove market barriers to enable a dynamic 
clean energy economy at a scale to create 
opportunities and growth while protecting the 
environment  
• DSP’s interact between consumers, sellers of 
products, and NYISO to create a market pricing 
platform that allows monetization and exchange 
of resources such as DER, DSM, EE, storage 
• Encourage energy network companies to play a full role in 
achieving a sustainable energy sector and delivering long term 
value in network services for current and future consumers. 
• Emphasize customer satisfaction, reliability, safe network 
services, better connection terms, environmental integrity, etc. 
• Transparent, upfront price control framework sets out what 
outputs network companies need to deliver upper limit on 
allowed return, symmetrical incentives. Increased involvement 
of network companies and non-network parties. 
O
rg
an
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na
l l
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 m
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• NY Department of Public Service Case 14-M-0101 
Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in 
Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, proposed 
4/24/14 (NYPSC, 2014) and order adopted 
2/26/15 
• 2015 NY State Energy Plan outlines how to enact 
REV. 
• Integrates three strategic pillars: 
o PSC’s REV Docket promotes greater 
consumer choice in energy use 
o NYSERDA’s Clean Energy Fund provides 
$5B in new green energy investment over 10 
years, starting in 2016. 
o NYPA’s programs lead by example. 
• New York State Department of Public Service 
wrote REV 
• Public Service Commission (PSC) is a government 
agency 
• PSC authority under Public Service Law, Rules 
and Regulating of the PSC- 16 NYCRR.  
• Recommended to apply REV gradually: 2 tracks  
§ Track 1: examines the role of distribution 
utilities in promoting EE, load management, 
• RPI-X@20 Recommandations Consultation proposed 7/26/10. 
• Ofgem’s RIIO final Decision (OFGEM, 2010) and handbook 
10/4/10 
• 3 pillars 
o Upfront ex-ante 8 year price control  
o Option for third parties for deeper engagement  
o Time limited innovation stimulus open to both utilities 
and third parties 
• Ofgem wrote RIIO 
• Ofgem work with but independent of government 
• Ofgem’s governing body is GEMA (Gas and Electricity 
Markets Authority), also referred to as The Authority 
• GEMA’s authority is provided under Gas Act 1986, Electricity 
Act 1989, Utilities Act 2000, Competition Act 1998, Enterprise 
Act 2002, measures set out in a number of Energy Acts. 
• Applied in 4/13 in TPCR5, GDPCR2 and 4/15 in DPCR6 16 
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17 Staff recommends an opt-out data exchange because integrating DER requires standardized time stamped energy usage information. A single 
entity to operate a data exchange is being considered. 
18 Any party can make a price control modification request to GEMA during the final proposals stages. GEMA, the gatekeeper, determines 
whether this modification request should be referred to the Competition Commission. 
19 Companies can compete for partial finding outside of the price control framework. There is one fund for gas and one fund for electricity. Both 
are open to network and non-network parties.  
DER, consumer control, and wholesale 
market issues; considers whether distribution 
utilities should serve as DSPs 
§ Track 2: regulatory and ratemaking changes 
Bu
si
ne
ss
 M
od
el
 
R
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• 43 different programs offered in NY Plan. 
• Transactions take place in a nonlinear manner. 
• Distribution network operators submit and publish realistic 
business plans with demonstrable value to consumers. 
Po
te
nt
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l (
Ex
is
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l) 
R
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M
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• Market power concerns over distribution utility 
acting as DSP. 
• Concerns over whether MBEs can replace 
traditional utility earnings. 
• Combine financial incentives such as new MBEs, 
ratemaking adjustments, concrete targets with 
positive, symmetric, and bidirectional earnings 
impacts.17 
• Each utility submitted a Benefit-Cost- Analysis 
(BCA). 
• DPS recommends financial incentives such as new 
MBEs to simplify access to DSP platform and to 
offset impact of DSP capital by sharing platform 
costs, adjustments to conventional rates, new 
positive only symmetrical bidirectional earnings 
impacts. 
• Reopeners i.e. uncertainty mechanisms 
• Third parties can appeal to the Competition Commission make 
requests for price control before instituted18 
• 3 part time-limited innovation stimulus19  
o Annual Network Innovation Competition replaces the 
Low Carbon Network Fund 
o Network Innovation Allowance funds small scale 
innovation projects 
• Innovation Roll-out Mechanism where companies can apply to 
additional funding to apply a proven innovation 
• Right balance between 8-year price control and reopeners 
• If efficiency inventive rates are properly set 
• Risk sharing through the symmetric efficiency uncertainty 
mechanisms 
• Provision in the revenue system to cater for rise in demand or 
volumes of activity 
5.0. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analysis presented in this paper represents a method for systematically 
structuring and reviewing key dimensions of ‘Utility 2.0’ candidates. The 
approach highlights the importance of a multi-dimensional reflection of the 
business model of new proposals for utility and energy governance.  
We offer that the multi-dimensional deconstruction of business model 
functioning, like we have done in this paper for the two utility business models, 
could become a function of the Utility 2.0. and beyond. Such an integrated 
platform and approach provides a suitable analytic tool for studying the still hazy 
future of the Utility 2.0 marketplace. Five issues, in particular, incorporate the 
lessons we have learned through the application of this framework, namely: 
• Infrastructure to services network transformation inevitably offers the 
support for deepening personalization and value maximization that 
electric utilities should prioritize and seize to sustain the next phase of their 
business model transformation e.g. new services, and new platforms for 
extending commodity distribution, system continuity, and stability; 
• Market disruption and disintermediation pose a less predictable future and 
significant risks to traditional rate-based revenue models. Consequently, 
utilities should formulate a more flexible revenue model to keep with new 
market realities and to deliver value beyond reliable and affordable 
kilowatt-hours; 
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• The grid-customer interface will become more sophisticated as the rate of 
interaction between consumers and utility providers go up, requiring new 
level of flexibility, preferences, and expansion in seamless customer-facing 
automation beyond the current services; 
• A compelling value proposition should be expanded to include distributed 
generation and energy storage opportunities, particularly in using 
curtailable renewable energy options for grid control, resiliency, and create 
additional value for different categories of consumers; 
• A multi-dimensional analytical approach along the lines proposed in this 
paper should be reconstructed beyond dimensions of profit motivation 
and profit achievement to prioritize energy cost savings, carbon mitigation, 
future-proofing of energy infrastructure, and reducing economic impact of 
extended outages, especially in a decentralized and disaggregated 
marketplace envisioned in the Utility 2.0 regime (Satchwell & Cappers, 
2015; Zinaman, et al., 2015). 
Based on these lessons learned, several avenues for further research emerge. In 
particular, analysis will need to bear out how the various dimensions interact with 
each other and perhaps strengthen or weaken the (intended) functioning of the 
overall policy proposal. A pricing control strategy, for instance, is primarily 
utility-focused and could perhaps have unintended consequences for end-use 
customers of energy. A second avenue for research is to determine the interaction 
pattern between existing policy conditions and the proposed business model 
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reform. Previous policies in the United Kingdom for instance have been put forth 
to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency but might 
have complicated interaction effects with the platform-based reform represented 
by RIIO. Questions about whether such interaction effects slow or accelerate the 
transition to sustainable energy will need to be investigated and answered. 
Finally, an obvious pathway for future research is to apply the framework devised 
throughout this paper on additional business models and seek further 
improvement of the analytical tool.  
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